

The Role of Human Rights in US Foreign Aid Policy: An Assessment of US Aid to Pakistan and its Nexus with Human Rights

Murad Ali, PhD

Assistant Professor,
University of Malakand, Pakistan
muradali.uom@gmail.com

Abstract

The United States (US) has been one of the pioneering aid donors that passed legislative amendments in the Foreign Assistance Act and linked US economic and military assistance to human rights performance of aid recipient governments. These were indeed watershed moments for human rights activists not only in the US but elsewhere. However, the US has rarely implemented these laws since their enactment in the mid-1970s. Focusing on past as well as contemporary US aid policies towards Pakistan, this paper examines the extent to which the US has actually linked aid to human rights. Analyzing US economic and military aid to Pakistan during three distinct periods: the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the 'war on terror', the study illustrates that the US has conveniently ignored human rights violations of respective regimes that were vital for safeguarding US foreign policy goals in the region. The paper concludes that when US geo-strategic, security and political interests are at stake, human rights are not a significant determinant in US aid allocation. The contribution of this paper is that it is the first study of its kind that has comprehensively analyzed US aid policies vis-à-vis human rights in the context of Pakistan.

Keywords: US, Pakistan, economic and military aid, human rights

I. Introduction: Aid for development, good governance and human rights

In its modern form, foreign aid officially started in the post-War War II landscape. To rebuild the war ravaged European economy, General George Marshall, then US Secretary of State came up with a comprehensive reconstruction plan. Hence, it became known as the Marshall Plan and under this plan the US gave US \$13 billion to Europe to enable it to stand on its own feet after it had been afflicted by WWII. Raffer and Singer (1996, p. 59) assert that "after approval by Congress in 1948, the US spent 2-3 per cent (excluding military aid) of its GNP under this initiative during the six years". Following its success, US President Truman came up with a similar programme to develop underdeveloped countries of the world (Rist, 2002). As a result, President Truman announced his 'Point Four Programme' and gave its outline in his historic inaugural address in 1949. He stated, "fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" (Truman, 1949). The US President also asserted that over half of the world population was suffering from hunger, disease and poverty and stressed that other rich and wealthy countries need to assist the US in

helping develop the underdeveloped regions that lack enough resources. Thus, the Marshall Plan and President Truman's Point Four Programme resulted in a formal beginning of foreign assistance from wealthy countries to poor ones.

Over the last sixty years, the aid regime and the objectives and motivations behind aid allocation have witnessed several shifts. As mentioned above, in its early age, the key rationale for foreign aid was to fill the gaps in the macro-economy of developing countries and provide a much needed surplus capital for economic progress (Chenery & Strout, 1966; Rosentein-Rodan, 1961). At the same time, aid was also used by donors as a soft power to win the allegiance of poor nations and keep them from joining the communist bloc (Browne, 1999; McKinlay & Little, 1978, 1979). There is an unending debate whether aid has done more good to aid recipients or donors. That is, whether aid has actually been effective in bringing improvements in the lives of the poor across the globe or whether it has served donors' own geo-strategic, political, security and trade interests. There is considerable evidence which suggests that foreign aid is primarily an arm of foreign policy of wealthy nations. However, at the same time there is also evidence that at times foreign aid has been quite successful and has helped in poverty alleviation in numerous poor countries. Hence, regarding these two dimensions of aid, Monye, Ansah and Orakwue (2010, p. 749) have appropriately summed up that "the debate goes on and the jury is still out".

Irrespective of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of aid in bringing development and reducing poverty, aid was also linked to various conditionalities or benchmarks to be fulfilled by aid recipients in order to be eligible to get aid from various donors. Thus, policy issues such as the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance started to play a role regarding whom to give aid. With the passage of time, along with other parameters democracy and human rights became more prominent policy benchmarks. Organisations such as The Asia Foundation and National Endowment for Democracy have been active in democracy promotion since 1956 and 1984 respectively (Talbot, 1996). Among bilateral donors, Germany was the first to prioritise democracy in its aid allocation policy and disbursed considerable aid funds for its promotion in the 1980s (Carothers, 1997). According to United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the main US government body authorized for foreign aid allocation and delivery, "for over 50 years USAID has been providing technical leadership and strategic support in promoting sustainable democracy...the rule of law and respect for human rights...more transparent and accountable governance" (USAID Democracy & Governance, 2010). Among bilateral aid donors, the US was perhaps a leading donor to have come up with congressional legislation in the 1970s and thus clearly linked US economic as well as military assistance to respect for human rights. As discussed later in this paper in some detail, through such legislation the US has made it clear that it will terminate both civilian and security aid to countries which are involved in the violation of internationally recognized human rights.

Focusing on the allocation of US economic as well as military assistance to Pakistan, the paper examines the extent to which the US has actually taken into account human rights situations in Pakistan while deciding to give aid. The paper first looks at the congressional amendments dealing with the provision of US civilian and security aid. This is followed by a brief description of the methodology and data to be analyzed. A brief overview of Pakistan's human rights performance follows. The subsequent sections

examine the provision of US aid, both civilian and military, and their nexus with Pakistan's human rights record during the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the 'war on terror' periods.

II. Congressional legislation on human rights and US aid

In the mid-1970s, the US amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act to clearly link the allocation of foreign aid with respect for human rights in aid-receiving countries. Two major congressional amendments dealing with the provision of aid and human rights are Section 116 and Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. The law dealing with the allocation of US economic aid and human rights is known as the Harkin Amendment and it prohibits the delivery of economic aid to human rights violators. Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which was signed into a law in 1974, states:

No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country (US Government, 2003, p. 59).

Similarly, a Congressional amendment, also known as the Humphrey-Cranston Amendment, was passed in 1974 to deal with the provision of US military assistance and human rights. The amendment, known as Section 502B, stipulates:

Except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (US Government, 2003, p. 230).

Though there is a provision for the Presidential certification in exceptional circumstances, at the same time the law adds that "the Congress may at any time thereafter adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such country" (US Government, 2003, p. 233). It further states that the eventual decision concerning the termination, restriction or continuation of aid will be taken in the light of the joint resolution of the Congress. It means that the Presidential certification can be overruled by the combined motion. Thus, it is appropriately argued that the US took tangible steps in the form of these amendments which clearly state that there will be no aid for human rights violators (Cmiel, 1999; Forsythe, 1987; Poe, 1991).

III. US aid and human rights: literature review

Ever since the US enacted the above Congressional amendments, there have been various studies investigating whether the US has actually followed these policies in letter and spirit. Most previous research indicates that the US has hardly implemented these legislation of cutting off aid to human rights violators (Regan, 1995). In one of the first studies on the subject, Schoultz (1981) found that the US has given more aid to countries that violated the human rights of their citizens. Stohl, Carleton and Johnson (1984) established that during the Nixon and Ford regimes, governments accused of human rights abuses received more US aid. Similarly, for the Carter and Regan periods, Carleton

and Stohl (1985) found that human rights did not play any significant role in determining the allocation of aid to developing countries. In their most comprehensive study on the relationship between US aid and human rights, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) have analyzed US aid to 140 countries between 1976-1995. Their study covers the tenures of Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton and they find that “human rights concerns are not the only, nor the largest consideration” in the allocation of US aid (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999, p. 193). The authors conclude that countries vital to US foreign policy ambitions “receive aid regardless of their human rights records” (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999, p. 196). The overall existing evidence indicates that rather than punishing human rights violators, the US has either ignored human rights abuses of the potential recipients (Blanton, 2000; Neier, 1996-1997; Poe, 1992) or allocated more official aid to strategic allies with gross human rights violations (Chomsky, 1978, 2003).

The main distinctive characteristic of this study is that it explores US official aid allocation to Pakistan through a holistic, systematic and in-depth empirical analysis covering three distinct periods: the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the era of the so-called ‘war on terror’. Previous studies on the subject have focused mainly on the Cold War years and some years of the post-Cold War period. There are by and large similar tendencies concerning the relationship between human rights and foreign aid during the Cold War as well as in post-Cold War years (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a, 2003b). As this study outreaches to the ‘war on terror’ as well, hence the analysis and conclusions drawn from this study cover a larger span of time consisting of the Cold War, post-Cold War and the ‘war on terror’ periods. Thus, it is the first study that comprehensively examines the allocation of both US economic and military aid to Pakistan vis-à-vis human rights performance of the latter.

IV. Methodology and data

Most of the data has been obtained from different databases and from available secondary sources. Data pertaining to US economic and military assistance has been obtained from the USAID database that keeps a record of all assistance the US gives to different countries under various formats. Data related to human rights performance has been obtained from the database of Political Terror Scale (PTS), which manages all the data and ranks countries based on their human rights performance. According to PTS averages, all countries are ranked on a scale of one to five, representing best human rights performer and worst offender. The PTS is the measurement of the personal integrity rights records of countries and it indicates the extent to which the state or government violates physical integrity rights of its citizens. This includes such state actions as political imprisonment, disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings (Gomez, 2007; Neumayer, 2003b). A score of one means there is little or no violation of personal integrity rights while a score of five indicates gross human rights abuses including torture, political imprisonment, detention with or without trial, disappearances, brutality and political murder (McCan & Gibney, 1996). Based on these data sets, the paper explores the extent to which the US has actually linked the provision of economic and military aid to Pakistan with respect for human rights.

V. Pakistan’s human rights performance at a glance

Table I shows Pakistan’s human rights performance based on average scores in Amnesty International (AI) and US State Department reports from 1976 to 2008. According to the PTS averages, all the countries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 5,

representing best human rights performers and worst offenders. The following ranking illustrates that Pakistan has a bad record of human rights for most years. From 1976 to 2015, it has just once scored below 2, which means it has been involved in serious human rights violations of its own citizens. The data in the table clearly shows that during all these years, Pakistan's human rights record and performance has remained dismal: whether the country was under military rule (as in the 1980s and then 1999-2008) or parliamentary democracy (during the 1990s). It is also clear that the country's human rights record did not improve with the passage of time and remained bleak whether it was the Cold War period, the post-Cold War period or the 'war on terror' era since 2001.

Table 1: PTS averages of Pakistan

Year	Pakistan's PTS score	Year	Pakistan's PTS score
1976	1	1996	4
1977	3.5	1997	3.5
1978	3	1998	4
1979	3.5	1999	4.5
1980	3	2000	3.5
1981	3.5	2001	4
1982	4	2002	4
1983	3.5	2003	4
1984	3	2004	3.5
1985	3	2005	4
1986	3	2006	4
1987	3	2007	4
1988	3	2008	4
1989	3	2009	4.5
1990	3.5	2010	5
1991	3.5	2011	5
1992	4	2012	5
1993	3.5	2013	5
1994	4	2014	5
1995	4.5		


Source: The Political Terror Scale (2015)

VI. US aid to Pakistan and human rights

Now the question is to what extent Pakistan's human rights performance has been taken into account by the US while deciding the allocation of economic and military assistance. Table II below shows both Pakistan's PTS scores and the amount of US economic as well as military assistance to the country since 1976; the year when the US came up with legislation linking aid to respect for human rights. Figure I below gives a graphic presentation of US aid from 1976 to 2014. The figure clearly illustrates that overall there are three trends in US aid to Pakistan: substantial aid during the military regime of General Zia in the 1980s, meager or no aid during the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s and again significant aid during the Musharraf tenure in the 'war on terror' period. As briefly discussed in the previous section, Pakistan's dismal record of human

rights violation has mostly remained the same during all these periods but there are two periods in which the nexus between US aid and Pakistan’s human rights abuses is markedly visible. The PTS data shows that Pakistan scored over three during the 1980s. Similarly, Pakistan has mostly scored four on PTS in the ‘war on terror’ period. During both these periods, Pakistan has been one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid due to its frontline role as a US ally during the first Afghan War in the 1980s and now in the ‘war against terrorism’. While Pakistan has had a bad record for human rights during the democratic tenures of late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s, USAID data in Table II shows that the US allocated negligible aid to the country during this period as the US abandoned its close Cold War ally after the demise of the Soviet Union. The remainder of this paper discusses the correlation between US aid and Pakistan human rights during these three distinctive periods.

Figure 1: US Economic and Military Aid to Pakistan



Source: Author, based on data obtained from US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), USAID (2015).

Table 2: Pakistan PTS averages and US economic and military aid

Year	PTS Average	Economic aid (constant 2008 US\$, millions)	Military aid (constant 2008 US\$, millions)
1976	1	826.98	1.29
1977	3.5	313.48	0.9
1978	3	211.13	1.49
1979	3.5	126.53	1.17
1980	3	135.17	0
1981	3.5	161.44	0
1982	4	393.96	1.18

1983	3.5	525.24	491.41
1984	3	558.57	546.62
1985	3	597.1	573.76
1986	3	613.06	536.63
1987	3	589.26	525.79
1988	3	756.99	423.89
1989	3	550.88	361.26
1990	3.5	539.24	278.87
1991	3.5	147.23	0
1992	4	26.74	7.09
1993	3.5	73.05	0
1994	4	67.35	0
1995	4.5	22.76	0
1996	4	22.43	0
1997	3.5	56.33	0
1998	4	35.8	0
1999	4.5	100.71	0.22
2000	3.5	45.06	0
2001	4	224.74	0
2002	4	921.41	347.63
2003	4	371.75	304.18
2004	3.5	399.32	95.65
2005	4	482.47	341.41
2006	4	681.94	324.72
2007	4	678.8	319.37
2008	4	605.36	358.09
2009	4.5	930.7	505.22
2010	5	1,068.50	964.23
2011	5	349.4	690.53
2012	5	919.7	849.23
2013	5	640.5	361.13
2014	5	440.4	353.27

Sources: The Political Terror Scale (2015) and US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), USAID (2015).

VII. US aid to Pakistan and human rights violations during the Cold War period

The final phase of the Cold War was staged in the backyard of Pakistan to stop the Soviet forces within Afghanistan. Pakistan was under US sanctions prior to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan rang an alarm bell in most Western capitals. The US and its allies wanted to stop and defeat Soviet forces inside Afghanistan. Willingly or unwillingly, the US had no option but to embrace military dictator General Zia in Pakistan. As US data shows, throughout the 1980s the US provided Pakistan substantial economic and military assistance. In relation to human right violations, the rule of General Zia is considered one of the most brutal military regimes in the history of the country. After coming to power through a military coup, General Zia suspended the 1973 Constitution, dismissed federal and provincial assemblies and banned every kind of political activity. With the abrogation of the constitution, fundamental human rights were suspended. In its 1978 annual report, the Amnesty International (1978, p. 147) observed that the “martial law Government in Pakistan has introduced measures designed to curb political dissent. The number of political prisoners has increased and now totals several thousand”. The report added that at least 160 political prisoners, arrested for taking part in peaceful political activities, have been flogged by the military junta. The serious violation of human rights continued throughout his ruthless military reign. The 1985 AI report noted that:

Amnesty International continued to be concerned about the detention of prisoners of conscience. It is also concerned that hundreds of other political prisoners were tried before military courts whose procedures fell short of internationally accepted standards for a fair trial...The organization also received reports of the deaths of criminal suspects in police custody, allegedly due to torture (Amnesty International, 1985, p. 233).

The overall data in Table II clearly shows that in this period Pakistan has regularly been ranked to be a country scoring three and above on the PTS, which indicates dismal human rights situations. At the same time, it is also quite clear that the US completely ignored this scenario and turned a blind eye to the military regime’s human rights abuses. The data illustrates (in Table II and corresponding Figure I) that during these years, Pakistan was one of the largest US aid recipients. In view of all this and the US Congressional laws concerning the provision of US aid and human rights, Pakistan should not have received US security and civilian aid during this period. The USAID data in Table II shows that the US actually sanctioned meagre economic aid and security assistance was almost nil during the preliminary years of the Zia regime. However, as the USAID data has shown, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 changed the geo-strategic landscape in favor of General Zia. In the same context, Ali (2008, p. 117) has appropriately stated that “from being viewed as a squalid and brutal military dictator, he [General Zia] was transformed into a necessary ally defending the frontiers of the free world against the godless Russians”. Hence, the US conveniently ignored human rights abuses of the Zia regime throughout the 1980s as the latter was provided generous civilian and security assistance (Table II). While the US allocated hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid, Pakistani military junta opened the floodgate of ‘*jihadis*’ or ‘*mujahedeen*’ (holy warriors) to fight the evil and godless Soviet empire. It is now an open secret that ‘*jihadis*’ were brought to Pakistan from 43 Islamic countries (Rashid, 2000). These freedom fighters were facilitated and trained in collaboration by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency the

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with enormous funding from the US, Saudi Arabia and other Western and Arab states. To sum it up, as military dictator General Zia was a staunch US ally, human rights violations had no real significance vis-à-vis US security interests. Thus, Pakistan was one of the largest recipients of US aid irrespective of that fact that a brutal military dictator accused of grave human rights abuses was ruling the country.

VIII. The post-Cold War decade of the 1990s and US aid to Pakistan vis-à-vis human rights

After the mysterious and hitherto unexplained death of General Zia along with some top military brass in a plane crash in 1988, general elections were held in the country the same year. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, who had been hanged by General Zia, emerged victorious and became the first and so far the only female Prime Minister of Pakistan. While democracy was restored in the country after 11 long years of military rule, the situation was far from stable. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US foreign policy dramatically changed towards Pakistan, one of the closest Cold War allies. Pakistan, a frontline US ally during the Cold War, completely fell into disfavor on account of its nuclear programme. With the collapse of the Soviet Union when Pakistan's assistance was no longer required, it was not only left alone but rather the discriminatory and country-specific Pressler Amendment was swung into action in 1990 and sanctions were imposed on Pakistan because of its nuclear programme (Kux, 2001; Paul, 1992). Consequently, Pakistan was faced with a serious economic crisis. All the channels of US aid to Pakistan were shut down in a short time. Cohen and Chollet (2007, p. 10) have appropriately noted that "what had once been one of the largest U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offices in the world, employing more than 1,000 staff around the country, shrank to almost nothing virtually overnight". Thus, the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship dived to the level of indifference and covert hostility in the post-Cold War period.

It is clear from USAID data that US economic aid lowered from well above US \$ 500 million a year to less than US \$ 100 million a year in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s. The fate of military assistance was not different as it became almost nothing in these years. Overall, while the US sanctioned more than US \$ 500 annually to Pakistan in the 1980s, in the entire next decade the country was able to receive a total of US \$ 598 million in US aid in constant 2008 US \$. Reduction in US aid was not on account of human rights violation. This was because Pakistan no longer had any geo-strategic significance for the US in the post-Cold War decade. Thus, although human rights performance was not good during this decade, democracy had been restored in the country and the US should have assisted the nascent democratic regimes.

IX. The 'war on terror', human rights and US aid to Pakistan

Like the Cold War era, the 'war on terror' episode since 9/11 is another distinctive example of US aid to Pakistan from the perspective of human rights. The events of September 11, 2001, and Washington's subsequent war against terrorism changed the entire political and security paradigm of the planet. In its so-called 'war on terror', the US declared that either the nations of the world are with them or against them (Cohen & Chollet, 2007). Prior to 9/11, General Musharraf was to the Clinton and Bush

administrations what General Zia was to the Carter administration: “a squalid and brutal military dictator” (Ali, 2008, p. 117). While Musharraf’s Pakistan was a pariah state prior to 9/11, it was no longer the case after that. Despite being a military dictator, Musharraf’s alliance with the US led to the resumption of substantial US foreign assistance. As clearly illustrated in Figure I and Table II, along with economic aid, the US also restarted considerable military aid to the country after 9/11.

It is interesting to note that in the entire 1990s, the US allocated only US \$ 598 million in aid, mostly in humanitarian assistance. Military aid was merely US \$ 7 million. In comparison to this, USAID data in Table II shows that the US has channeled US \$ 8,490 million economic and US \$ 5,814 million military aid to Pakistan since 2001 after it agreed to play the role of a frontline state ally against terrorism. Thus it is evident from US foreign aid policy towards Pakistan that when US geo-strategic interests are at stake (as in most of the Cold War period and in the 1980s Afghan War), the US is likely to allocate more aid irrespective of lack of democracy and human rights abuses of aid recipients. Contrary to this, if a country is not deemed vital to safeguard and promote US interests, it is unlikely for it to obtain US aid, regardless of the fact that that the country in question has a democratic regime which needs to be strengthened rather than to be undermined (as in the 1990s in the case of Pakistan).

Regarding human rights violation, Pakistan’s record has been consistently bleak as the country has mostly scored 4 or above on the PTS. A few examples will further highlight how recent years have been disastrous with regard to respect for human rights. According to various reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, since the escalation of ‘war on terror’ at the domestic front, common people suffered from the atrocities by Taliban militants as well as at the hands of security forces which carried out torture, forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. However, as a frontline US ally in the campaign against terrorism, the US has completely overlooked this aspect in the allocation of aid to Pakistan. One of most unforgettable issues was the unconstitutional removal of the Chief Justice (CJ) of the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan by military dictator General Musharraf on the charges of corruption and misconduct in March 2007. The actual reason behind his ousting and dismissal was that the CJ had started taking *sue motto* notices of forced disappearances of citizens by intelligence agencies. The CJ’s defiant behavior antagonized the military dictator. After the CJ was removed from office on March 9, 2007, country-wide mass protests were held by lawyers and civil society organizations. On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan, a body of judges empowered under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan to hear and decide cases of misconduct against judges, restored the CJ. It became increasingly difficult for Musharraf to tolerate free and transparent judiciary under CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry. On November 3, 2007, General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency and sacked CJ Chaudhry and 60 other judges, illegally and unconstitutionally, when they refused to take oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) issued by Musharraf. All judges of the superior courts who did not submit to Musharraf and thousands of lawyers, opposition leaders and human rights activists were either placed in house detention or jail (Lodhi, 2011). During the entire judicial crisis, the US never pressed Musharraf to reinstate judges and stop human rights abuses. In view of all this, it is quite evident that the US has not linked aid to human rights in the case of Pakistan. While Pakistan has continued to perform terribly regarding human rights, the US has continued to provide economic and military aid as it serves US foreign policy goals related to the ‘war on terror’.

X. Conclusion

The paper has examined the allocation of US economic and military aid from the perspective of human rights performance of Pakistan. While the US amended its Foreign Assistance Act in the 1970s and introduced provisions that clearly aimed at blocking or cutting off aid to human rights violators; there is a wide gap between its avowed policy and actual practice. Analyzing US foreign aid policy over three distinctive periods in recent history covering the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the 'war on terror', this study has clearly shown that the US has not implemented its own Congressional legislation on foreign aid regarding human rights violation. The amount of US aid vis-à-vis Pakistan's human rights record illustrates that the US has never linked aid to Pakistan with respect for human rights. The overall analysis shows that the US has been giving most aid, both economic and military, to Pakistan not purely on account of the latter's satisfactory domestic political regimes characterized by genuine democracy and respect for human rights but because there are other factors and motivations. Irrespective of human right violations, the US has given more aid to Pakistan to further its own geo-strategic, security and political interests: both during the Cold War period and recently in the 'war on terror' period.

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