Balochistan Conflict: Internal and International Dynamics

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Abstract
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan and has geo-strategic significance. Balochistan is rich in natural resources including Gwadar Port. Despite having unlimited resources the people of Balochistan have remained deprived, and neglected by the provincial and central governments as a result conflict and unrest occurred in Balochistan. Presently, Balochistan has become a core strategic point for the international actors for its unique strategic location, mineral wealth and development of Gwadar port and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Presently, international linkages are exploiting Balochistan’s internal condition due to terrorism. Internal and international nexus have their political and economic interest. Thus, Balochistan has seen several insurgencies during military and the civil regimes. This paper explores the national and international dynamics which has posed security dilemma and the efforts of the state to develop and integrate the province and the Baloch people.

Keywords: Balochistan, security, ethnicity, development, India, Afghanistan, power, politics

Introduction
Balochistan has been conflictual province since 1947. This is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of territory, covering 40 percent of its land; (Government of Pakistan 1998:320) and the percentage of Pakistan’s Population of which it constitutes only 5 percent (Ibid). Historically the Balochis have not been a majority and are further divided along tribal and regional lines and Baloch the same time have felt neglected and oppressed by the both the central and provincial governments. Both Military and civil regimes have through their policies provoked the estrangement of mainstream Baloch opinion. Today, Balochistan has become a ‘hub of interests’ for the international actors which in the past have supported and harboured Baloch nationalists and continue their support today. While some ethnic groups have have peacefully integrated in the power structure of Pakistan, like Pashtuns and somewhat Sindhis, the Baloch appear to divide between
integrationists and separatists. Insurgencies of Balochistan in the past and even now have a foreign connection in terms of sanctuaries, financial support and political backing. Overall, the balance of power in Balochistan has shifted toward the integrationists. However, even limited, low intensity insurgency, which is the case of Balochistan can pose a challenge to stability, order, peace and might cause an opportunity cost. Such tendencies have been very harmful for Pakistan’s security and socio-economy, and also affected Pakistan’s relations with other countries. When Henry Kissinger was in Pakistan on a troubleshooting mission for US President J.F. Kennedy, a journalist asked him to comment on the Baloch insurgency. His answer was: ‘I wouldn’t recognize the Balochistan problem, (even) if it hit me in the face (Harrison1981:1). But ever since 1973, when an elected and civilian government sent armed forces to curb ethno-nationalists, Balochistan began to witness resistance and insurgency. For the last many years, development of Gwadar port and the war in Afghanistan have also shifted the interest of external powers in Balochistan(Sheikh 2009).

It is worth bearing in mind however that the Balochi people at large may not have views as radical as many of their leaders ever since 1948. It is claimed some reports a mere handful of Sardars or feudal tribal leaders who have led the movement against centre and have turned to help from Pakistan’s enemies (Zahida 2017),India and Afghanistan.

Balochistan economically stagnant, sparsely populated and arid is Pakistan’s largest, youngest, internally the most varied province (Ahmad1973:37). For decades the conflict between Baloch separatists and the central government was about “power and the desire to employ it to enable a particular good whether that good is seen as a strong unitary state or as the successful defence of Baloch autonomy (Khan2003:282). We will now attempt to explain why Balochistan is believed by some to constitute a security threat to Pakistan? What went wrong in the past? Will Balochistan be a new ‘frontier’ for the regional and major powers? In answering these questions, my proposition is that the Pakistan has greatly succeeded in integrating diverse ethnic groups through constitutional, economic and political processes. With a focus on CPEC and extensive development of Balochistan, the province will get more integrated.

**Brief History of Balochistan**

The Baloch, originally from the southern shores of the Caspian Sea and ethnically kindred to the Kurds, have a strong sense of cultural distinctiveness, rooted in an arcane language possibly derived from the lost language of the Medean civilization that existed in Asia Minor some six centuries before Christ. Shorty before the British arrived on the scene in the 19th century, a more or less parallel Baloch political identity had begun to develop under the leadership of a chief, Nasir Khan, who established a loose Baloch confederacy that lasted for nearly a century though paradoxically as a tributary of Afghanistan (Harrison1978:142).
Before partition the subcontinent was ruled by the British and their agenda for the Pashtun and Balochistan and Baloch settled regions was to subordinate them but subjugate them completely and employ their autonomy to develop them into buffer states acting during the colonial period, Balochistan was a complex mix of administrative regimes: The Kalat state, British Balochistan, and areas that the British leased from Kalat. British Balochistan (Which was made up of Pashtun areas that Afghanistan ceded to the British in the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak and The Marri-Bugti tribe zone) and the leased areas were directly administered.

Ruled by a Khan, Kalat was nominally independent, though as in the other princely states, the British exerted their dominance by various means, including vetting the Khan’s officials and paying subsidies to tribal leaders. The four princely states of Makran, Kharan, Lesbela and Kalat were brought under British informal rule. In 1876, Sir Robert Sandman concluded a treaty with the Khan of Kalat and brought his territories including Kharan, Makran and Lesbela under the British Raj (which retained ultimate suzerainty but did not attempt intensive control or taxation since the value of these relationships was essentially strategic(Ibid).

“In 1883, the British leased the Bolan Pass, southeast of Quetta, from the Khan of Kalat but in perpetuity. In 1887, some areas of Balochistan were declared British territory. In 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated an agreement with Amir Abdur Rehmann of Afghanistan Khan to fix the Durand Line running from Chitral to Balochistan as the boundary between Afghanistan and British India. Some Afghan elements have questioned this boundary on the ground that it was imposed by the British colonial government of India upon a weak neighbour”(Entessar1979,97). It is however a legitimate boundary which Pakistan inherited as a successor state of the British India in this part of the subcontinent.

After World War II, the British government’s announcement of its intended withdrawal from India provided the occasion for Afghan leaders to question once more the validity of the Durand Line. They contended that the inclusion of six million Pashtuns in the North-West Frontier Province of the newly established state of Pakistan was unjustified. They maintained that the Pashtuns had close ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties with the Afghans, and they should be given the opportunity to join Afghanistan or create an independent homeland following the partition of India. Instead, the Pashtuns and Balochis were limited to choosing between India or Pakistan in the plebiscite conducted in July 1947(Entessar).

Origins of Balochistan’s Conflict

The Khan of Kalat collaborated with the British but periodically demanded that all Baloch areas someday be returned to his domain. When Great Britain withdrew from the subcontinent in August 1947, the Khan refused to join the newly created state of Pakistan, declaring an independent Balochistan. Faced with the prospect of Pakistani military moves against Kalat, the Khan offered to accept a confederated status granting the control of defence, foreign affairs, and currency to the central government, but his proposal was rejected (Harrison 1981:143).
In fact, the Baloch people’s struggle for political rights began as soon as the state of Kalat signed an Instrument of Accession with Pakistan on March 27, 1948. Ahmad Yar Khan had signed the Instrument of Accession despite the fact that it was rejected by both houses of Kalat state (PIPS:2009,18). In fact, the Accession increased resentment among the Sardars (chiefs), a month after the Khan signed the Instrument of Accession, Abdul Karim led an armed group into Afghanistan in protest against the agreement (.Paul Titus and Nina Swidler:2000,47-69).

From the very beginning, Pakistan had deeper interest to integrate the tribal regions of Balochistan into the national mainstream. Therefore, with the departure of the British, Pakistani central governments attempted to reverse the Sandeman policy of internal tribal autonomy to meet the goal of a strong and centralized state. In the process, the attempt has been to merge the fiercely guarded Baloch identity into a composite Pakistani identity. The agreement between Quaid–e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat had promised autonomy to the Baloch tribes within the general context of Pakistani nationalism and national state. The Baloch nationalists however have been claiming that the terms of the Instrument of Accession were not honoured after Jinnah’s death. They consider it a breach of trust that has pushed some of the Baloch nationalists towards militant ethnicity.

The Rising Strategic Importance of Balochistan

Balochistan province as we know it today came into being on July 1, 1970, with the abolition of One Unit in West Pakistan, when the administrative divisions of Quetta and Kalat were merged to form this province. It remained under the bureaucratic rule of the central government until after the elections of December 1970 and the restoration of civilian rule in December 1970. Power was returned to the province only with the convening of the provincial Assembly in April 1972(Ahmad,4).

Balochistan’s physical features are strategically sensitive and significant for Pakistan survival and security. Due to some of these features, Balochistan is becoming a ‘hub’ for the regional and major powers of China, U.S.A, Iran, Afghanistan and India. Balochistan’s area includes Iranian Balochistan to its West and parts of Afghanistan are located in its North where it touches the Pashtun Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Balochistan is bound on the West by 520 miles long border with Iran and on the north by 720-miles border with Afghanistan. In the East are the Pakistani provinces of Sind, Punjab and a part of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Its extended sea–board runs along the Sistan region of Iran ending at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. With a 470 mile Arabian Sea coast line, the province occupies almost three- fourth of Pakistan’s entire coast which makes it a channel for accessing the Straits of Hormuz, one of the key strategic points in the Indian Ocean (PIPS,20-21). The Balochistan coast provides with an exclusive economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas and minerals spread over approximately 180,000 square kilometers while giving Balochistan considerable strategic importance, for two of Pakistan’s three naval bases --- Ormara and Gwadar
are situated on the Balochistan coast (Niazi 2005). The new Gwadar Port has been just commissioned in 2008, with Chinese financial and technical assistance. The Chief Minister of Balochistan declared, “Gwadar belongs to the Baloch people and no one would be allowed to sell it to anti-Baloch forces” (Akbar 2008). This port has been a cause of constant political turmoil in Balochistan for the past eight years, long before it became operational. Baloch nationalists fear that the local population would be turned into a minority for strategic reasons arising from the importance of the port to Pakistan.

Balochistan Conflict during Civil-military regimes

The Baloch nationalists have been able to create a sense of strong Baloch identity because “the government tried to resolve the issue through reactive measures” (Mirza:2013,24). The Baloch nationalists have also succeeded in creating a narrative of backwardness, victimhood and denial of adequate share in the natural resources—natural gas—and political power and economic development. They have regarded national policies toward Balochistan as offering cosmetic and inadequate authority to the Baloch people. A deep sense of denial of real power to the ‘true’ representatives of the Baloch has evoked considerable unhappiness. The Baloch nationalists have voiced their concerns under both the military and democratic regimes. They have built up the narrative of alienation on grounds of use of military force quell down the insurgency. Hardly, they tell their followers or realise that no state in the world can tolerated armed groups challenging the writ of the state, not matter what the grievances. This also needs to be mentioned that the grievances and alienation develops for political reasons, and it is failure of politics that allows them to get ethnic steam.

The causes of the direct confrontation with the central governments have been the same, whichever the regime. Balochistan has seen four major clashes with the central government since Pakistan’s inception. The first wave of conflict started during General Ayub’s era in 1958-59 when the most extreme resistance to the One Unit took place in Balochistan. Ayub was the first military ruler who used force against the Baloch leaders. The army moved into Kalat and arrested the Khan and other political leaders. Tensions grew when the army demanded that weapons be handed over; an order the tribesmen refused to comply with. Nouraiz Khan, the chief of the Zehri tribe, organised a guerrilla force, demanding the return of the Khan to power and the withdrawal of the One-Unit scheme, but was arrested and later died in prison. After a decade, insurgency erupted again in 1963-1969 when the central government sent the Army to build new garrisons in Balochistan. Baloch leaders organised guerrilla warfare: Sher Muhammad Marri established 22 camps in the Marri-Bugti and Mengal areas and they began to challenge the power of the national state. As a reaction to this move, the military regime of General Mohammad Ayub Khan took legal, administrative and political measure to break the power of the Sardars. Three of the most prominent Baloch sardars—Akbar Bugti, Attaulilha Khan Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri were deposed from their chieftainships (Harrison:1981,50). The army kept operations until Ayub Khan’s government offered a general amnesty. This resulted in a temporary peace. There was yet another
episode in the waning years of Ayub Khan rule. In 1968, the military regime allotted lands to the non-Balochi (Punjabi settlers) But peace was secured by allotting lands to the Baloch more in numbers than the Punjabis.

Balochistan conflict re-emerged under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was elected prime minister. Bhutto dismissed the provincial government of the National Awami Party (NAP) on the trumped up charges that it was raising Baloch armies to secede from Pakistan. The central government charged the provincial government with organising their own police force, allowing or encouraging the lawless behaviour of the Baloch Students Organization (BSO) and Marri tribesmen (Sher Muhammad Marri) and obstructing the work of the Coast Guard so its supporters could smuggle arms (Paul Titus and Nina Swidler). When Bhutto dismissed the government, Punjabi bureaucrats were forced to quit Quetta, their houses were destroyed and some were killed by Baloch nationalists who launched a guerrilla war which went on for four years until Bhutto was thrown out of power by the military (Marri 2016). Bhutto's decision to send army into Balochistan strengthened the role of the military in politics, which eventually led to his being overthrown (Haasan:2000,186). General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, another military ruler, used policy of peace and granted amnesty to the Baloch guerrillas in 1978, allocated funds for their rehabilitation and released thousands of remaining prisoners (Ahmad 2000). These measures gradually brought the Baloch nationalists into the national mainstream. The revival of democracy in the 1980s in Pakistan brought about fundamental change in the politics of the Balochistan National Party, the Balochistan National Movement and the Jamhoori Watan Party in the national politics. Baloch politics changed with national political coalitions and became part of rival political alliances at the federal and provincial level. Benazir Bhutto’s government substantively addressed the resentment of Baloch nationalists and rehabilitated 300 Baloch Marri tribesmen trapped in Afghanistan by their Sardars. Integrationist measures, reduced Baloch grievances but didn’t end them. The Baloch elites continue to voice concerns about the distribution of financial resources between the central government and their province. They have been pressing for a greater share of royalties from the sale of natural gas, a better deal in the allocation of finances for development, and greater provincial autonomy (Iqbal 2016).

**Balochistan Conflict during Musharraf**

Conflicts and insurgencies in Balochistan have gone in cycles, ending with a political settlement. It seems insurgencies have either reactive to state policies or actions or instrumental to forwarding an agenda of rights and provincial autonomy. The lingering issues that have continuously defined the Baloch problems (ethnic movements) are its natural resources, territorial size and and growing strategic importance on the mouth of the Gulf and Gwadar port. In the past, whenever the federal government tried to explore the natural resources of Balochistan the Baloch chiefs opposed it because they saw it as a threat to the existing social and political order that glorified had them. When Musharraf’s government initiated social and human development projects in Balochistan, the Balochi Sardars (chiefs) had long opposed the development of Gwadar Port and the establishment of an army
cantonments in Balochistan which resulted direct conflict with military regime. Economic development and expansion of state institution is feared to work against the ‘separatist’ interests of the Baloch insurgents and their foreign backers. As alluded above, they also fear a demographic change which the development of Balochistan, which is likely to be caused by opening up the region to other ethnic groups (Aamir 2014).

Fearing long-term of development of Balochistan and the expansion of security infrastructure in the province, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti using familiar nationalist language said, “the tribes have special interests, and control of natural resources is our primary demand. We own the natural resources, but these are being exploited for the benefit of others. We will not allow others to steal our wealth. Your sensitive installations will remain insecure, because you have pilfered, what belongs to our people(Khan 2003).” Bugti was killed in ambiguous circumstances on 26th August 2006. While the nationalist believe it was a result of military operation, the Musharraf regime insisted it was done by the militants who below up the entry of the cave where Bugti was hiding when the military officers came there to negotiate with him. Bugti was killed, and the nationalist got a great ‘martyr’ for their cause. Therefore, Baloch leaders went Afghanistan or received askance from India to continue their struggle to fight with the central government (Javed, Jahngir: 2015, 19-105).

Balochistan Package and Eighteenth Amendment

Contrary to what Musharraf did, the PPP government that succeeded him started to normalize situation in Balochistan by taking economic, political and security measures. The Zardari regime announced the Balochistan Package, named as Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan (beginning of the rights of Balochistan) as a first step toward addressing the alienation and dissatisfaction of geographically the largest and mineral rich province of Pakistan where a situation of insurgency in some parts had been been growing during the Musharraf decade (1999-2008). It was the first serious attempt to deal with a pile of grievances of the province that had accumulated over the decades, but more during the military regime of Pervez Musharraf. Although the package appeared to show a good understanding of the problems of Balochistan and offered a political remedy, it was at best a good opening to redefine relationship between the federation and the province of Balochistan. The tens of billions of rupees that came with Package along with increasing representation of the Baloch youth in government jobs failed to either alley the fears of the nationalist Baloch nor bring them back into the national mainstream politics. What it demonstrated was a clear departure from the approach of Pervez Musharraf and the civilian government.

The Package attempted to address the issue of underdevelopment, poverty and giving ownership of development back to the Baloch representatives. The Package was a part of larger efforts to transition centre-tilted cooperative federalism that Pakistan has practiced to a more balanced one that would address the grievances of the smaller provinces. The Package served a good signal to the Baloch nationalist
leaders about the willingness of the federation and the mainstream political parties to renegotiate centre-province relationship. The process of formulating the Package was more inclusive than any such effort in the past. It was conceived to be as a beginning of recognition of the rights of Balochistan and engage the Baloch leaders into a dialogue on resolving tricky issues of provincial autonomy, empowerment and rights of the provinces over natural resources. The Package brought about much needed development but not to the extent that it had visualized. As predicted, the Baloch nationalists rejected the package by saying usual things that it was “fraudulent” and “peanut” and “too little, too late.” Senator Mir Hasil Bezenjo said there should be some practical steps for the welfare of the people of Balochistan, who were living with deep sense of deprivation. He rejected the package as a fraud and said that there was nothing in it for the people of Balochistan. Senator Abdul Malik said the package was only a game of words, as it would further increase hopelessness among the people of the area” (Rehman 2009).

Besides the Balochistan Package, two other positive development need to be mentioned. The first is a consensus on the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, after almost two decades. The Award divides pool of nationally accumulated financial resources between the federation and the provinces. For the first time, Balochistan got more resources than its share of population due to factors of underdevelopment and vast territories. Second, the passage of the 18th Amendment has been a major landmark event in the constitutional history of the country.

The real and big change came with the national consensus on the 18th Amendment into the Constitution that addresses the longstanding issue of provincial autonomy. Actually, the Amendment has redefined Pakistani federalism. Early signs pointed toward resolution of Balochistan issue as all the major political parties have evolved a consensus on greater provincial autonomy than the previous provisions of the 1973 Constitution could allow. The Amendment has set into motion a new process of devolution of power to the provinces, but still there are lot issues relating to civil services, money, royalty and the mega projects, like CPEC and Gwadar that require time, consultation and better coordination to settle. But the political forces have changed the spirit of federalism in favour of the provinces, which is likely to promote more autonomy and empowerment in the coming decades.

International factors

External intervention in Balochistan is one among the several grave challenges to the unity and integrity of the Pakistani state (Shahbaz 2009). India is supporting not only Baloch nationalists in Balochistan, and providing money into covert operations there to destabilise Balochistan. Indian Naval serving officer and RAW gannet, Kalbhusan Jadhav, was captured by the Pakistani security forces when he attempted to cross Pakistan border from Iran (Shah 2016). India has drawn a line around Balochistan and prepared a Balochistan specific policy according to a white paper to exploit the division within Pakistan and expose its weaknesses in Balochistan, FATA and Azad Kashmir. A sustained diplomatic campaign has been undertaken by India to build international pressure, especially from the US, with the
message that should such efforts failed, India was ready for war. The Indian government led by Narendra Modi is more harsh toward Pakistan and has clear policy to exploit Pakistan’s internal problems particularly Balochistan. On Indian independence day Prime minister Modi clearly mentioned ‘Balochistan’ in his speech that showed Indian intervention in Balochistan (Indiatoday 2016).

Afghanistan is also supporting an unrest in Balochistan, trying to bolster the leadership of separatists fighting the government (Shah, 2015). This is widely seen as an Afghan-India cooperation to protect their strategic interest in this region. Both consider Pakistan as their ‘common’ Gwadar port which has emerged as a central piece of China-Pakistan economic and security cooperation is seen by India as a ‘threat’ to its grandiose strategic designs of ‘encircling’ Pakistan. China’s enormous expenditure on this deep sea port should give it a facility which would provide access to the Gulf and the oil and gas resources of the Middle East. It seems that US, a new strategic partner of India views the development of Gwadar and CPEC with some suspicion and reservation though not currently with outright hostility.

The Evolving Civil-military Cooperation

One of the the major reason of Balochistan’s grievances is low representation in the federal structure of power, including the armed forces of Pakistan. This has changed with a deliberate policy of targeted recruitment of youth in the officer rank, which now stands at roughly to the proportion of Baloch population of 5 percent. For many decades, the Balochi youth did not explore joining the Pakistan armed forces due to some nationalist influence. Prior to this policy, even in the Baloch Regiment, non-Baloch were recruited from other provinces. The military realized this historical issue and took several initiatives to develop Balochistan, including greater representation in the armed forces (Mirza Aslam Beg 2015). Civil- and military leadership had the same policy regarding the development of this generally deprived province. General Kayani after taking over command from Musharraf gave a new direction to the Balochistan policies with a focus on development in which the armed forces would play a critical role.

Musharraf’s questionable policies throughout the country but mainly in Balochistan had created a big security mess (Harrison 1981: 102). Musharraf era politics had alienated Baloch people, and as a reaction, the militant wings emerged and they began attacking security forces and public installations. Post-Musharraf Balochistan was a challenge for civil-military leadership. Zardari himself tried to persuade main political groups in Balochistan to amicable settle the problems. As a result of his efforts, he was able to form a coalition with the Baloch elites to contest the 2008 elections. His party was able to form a coalition government in Balochistan and Aslam Raisani was made Chief Minister who was a controversial figure had less interest in Balochistan’s development programs. Instead, the military monitored all development projects in Balochistan because Raisani was not a trustworthy figure, and spent his time out of the province.
The civil-military leaders feel that political participation and socio-economic progress are the essentials tool in democratic system to integrate backward provinces like Balochistan. However, things have not gone smoothly in the province. Zardari government made promises and offered economic packages to Balochistan which met some expectations but not all because the funds absorbing capacity of the province has been low. Pouring more funds without ownership and scrutiny has given rise to corruption only. The military presence annoyed the Baloch leaders they demanded Zardari’s government to send the army back and decrease the power of Frontier Corp (FC). They demanded end to Musharraf’s policy (Zahida). Zardari as President of Pakistan was not able to assert control over national and defence policy it was military’s domain and the military leadership had to decide about army’s withdrawal. Zardari government, however, offered an economic package in 2009 which was rejected by the Baloch leaders because they demanded full autonomy under the Constitution of 1973. The military had had its concerns in granting greater autonomy to Balochistan because India and Afghanistan both have been actively involved in destabilizing Balochistan. Meantime, the military launched its own policy with a focus on education, infrastructure development, communication and recruitment in the armed forced in order to remove the perceptions of deprivation.

In 2011, General Kayani too some important measures to address the suspicions and grievance of the Baloch leaders. He made an announcements that the army would be withdrawn from Sui and Dera Bugti, the most troubling and conflictual areas of Balochistan, construction of cantonment would be stopped, and that it would not be built against the wishes of Baloch people. Military decided to convert cantonment into a cadet college to recruit the Baloch youth in the Pakistan army. While the Military engaged itself in the development of Balochistan, the provincial government led by Raisani proved disastrous in governing the province. The corruption rose to the highest level, sectarianism increased and the security situation, particularly in Quetta remained perilous. Zardari government at the centre ignored Raisani’s incompetent cabinet, which miserably failed to improve the state of affairs. Zardari was head of the state and Raisani was representing his party as Chief Minister. Zardari was unwilling to alienate or displease his political partners in Balochistan. Ultimately, it was the Supreme Court of Pakistan under an activist Chief Justice Ifitkhar Chaudhry that took notice of law and order situation and highlighted the issue of missing persons in Balochistan. First time ever, the CJ called the regional in-charge of ISI in the Court to report about the missing persons. The government also received a warning from the CJ for not improving law and order situation in Balochistan. He warned that “the state of emergency would be declared” if the government failed to resolve crisis in Balochistan. According to an ISI officer, “agencies were not involved in missing persons. They were either killed by rival groups or they were hiding in Afghanistan. Interestingly, President of Afghanistan admitted that some of them (missing persons) were operating against the government and Pakistan army (Pakistan Tribune 2010). The intelligence agencies arrested only those who were involved in anti-state activities purely on the basis of evidence, and those who had been working for external powers (Khalil 2015).

Conclusion
Balochistan confronts multiple issues, political, security and ethnic. The province has seen cycles of rise of Baloch ethnicity and political accommodation. However, Baloch sub-nationalism has persisted over the decades. In its militant form, it has been aided by powers adversarial to Pakistan. External factor in the case of Baloch insurgencies of the past has been crucial one, which many observers tend to ignore. Since the end Musharraf regime, the two political governments—first of Zardari and now Mian Nawaz Sharif have pursued a course of political reconciliation, economic development and launching mega projects to integrate the most under-developed province. There is better understanding between the security establishment and the political governments at the centre and the province on how to stabilise and develop Balochistan. The civil-military coordination and cooperation and security and development of Balochistan—chiefly Gwadar port and CPEC—has begun to open up opportunities for Balochistan. There is greater involvement and ownership of Baloch parties, groups and leaders in the decision-making relating to issue of the province than ever before. However, there is more work to done on consistent basis. Durable stability and better political and security order would depend on the success of the mega projects, denying space to the militants and cutting off their links with their foreign backers. Pakistan will also have to address the issues of provincial rights, autonomy and adequate share in the natural resources of the province more adequately to the satisfaction of the Baloch elites. Finally, they need to have a sense of empowerment and ownership of all the development projects. Such policies resting on the two pillars of parliamentary democracy and participatory federalism would guarantee peace, harmony and development of Balochistan.

Notes:
1. The Treaty of Gandamak officially ended the first phase of the Second Anglo–Afghan War. Afghanistan ceded various frontier areas to Britain to prevent invasion of further areas of the country. It was signed by the emir of Afghanistan Mohammad Yaqub Khan and Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari representing the British Government of India on 26 May 1879, at a British army camp near the village of Gandomak, about seventy miles east of Kabul. [http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/GAG_GEO/GANDAMAK.html Date of access 12-11-2016]
2. Transcript of Accession of Kalat State is available on [www.balochvoice.com/.../instrument_of_accession_of_kalat_state.htm Date of access November 19,2010]
3. Abdul Karim Kahn was the younger brother of Kahn of Kalat, who was the key figure in the Baloch nationalist movement early in the post-colonial period. Prior to partition Adbdul Karim Khan was, commandant of Kalat state’s military, during Kalat’s short lived independence he had the post of governor. See for detail in Knights, Not Pawn: Ethno- Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan in Paul Titus and Nina Swidler
4. This tragedy took the lives of about 5,300 Baloch guerrillas and 3300 Pakistan army personnel. The economic and human cost of this conflict was

5. Dera Bugti, Sui, and Kohlu are the three major conflicting zones in Balochistan. These Baloch areas are the major camps of the Baloch Nationalists. Baloch nationalist parties, the Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front and People Liberation Army, launched attacks on sensitive installations and institutions and killed Chinese engineers at Gwadar port.


7. CEPEC is a mega project signed between China and Pakistan which is seen as game changer in the region. This project is not welcomed by India, and USA. Balochistan is a major rout to be used for transportation. Hussain Ahmad Siddiqi, “CEPEC projects: status, cost, and benefits,” *Dawn*, 12 June 2017.

8. Balochistan has been largely deprived of the due share in political power. The main Baloch princely State Kalat was reluctant to accede to Pakistan in 1947 but its rulers were forced to join Pakistan. Successive regimes in Pakistan have conducted military operations against the rebellious Baloch tribes, forcing them to seek help from their neighbors. The Ayub regime (1958-1969) Bhutto regime (1971-77). Gen. Zia adopted the policy of reconciliation after Bhutto, insurgency decreased and he enjoyed peace in Balochistan. For detail Selig. S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviets Temptation*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 1981).

9. The principal political groups include, Balochis National Movement (BNM), Baloch National alliance (BNA) and Baloch liberation army besides the mainstream political parties like Pakistan people’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Awami National Party (ANP) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam JUI (F). The Baloch political groups pursued a variety of agenda, ranging from autonomy to secession. The mainstream parties usually cobbled together a mixed coalition to rule the province and the Baloch political groups were co-opted by one or the other alliance.

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