Reflections on State Centrism (The Realist Paradigm) in International Relations from Peripheral Realist Standpoint

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Abstract:
The paper aims to revisit the priori beliefs and presumptions of the state centric approach, i.e. the Realist paradigm that guided the statecraft and state behavior in external affairs since the time of Thucydides and Greek city states. Based on the assumptions of hierarchy in terms of power, anarchy, self help, and balance of power the Realist thoughts provided for the rules of state craft and norms of state system for Greek city state system (the Hellas) as well as the European state system originating from the treaty of Westphalia (1648). The two great wars of 20th century changed the Westphalian state system with inclusion of large number of states from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. Hierarchy and inequality in capabilities and power of states remained a determining feature of state orders but with the entry of postcolonial states, a different kind of world order emerged, with acute differences in economic, military and technological capabilities of the core and peripheral states, and a natural gap of internally strong homogenous statehood of old members of Westphalian system and the new entrants of system in initial stages of state making. The new world order is the one with a clear divide between powerful states and the others without the power to sustain and survive autonomously. The world looks different from the perspective of power and relative absence of power. From a peripheral standpoint (a normative theory) as rule taker the reality of postcolonial states is missing in dominant realist scholarship of International Relations. The paper will provide a critical perspective on state centric approach, and the Realist paradigm by deconstructing the 20th century Realists like E. H. Carr, Morgenthau, Ken Waltz and John Mearsheimer, and the practical application of these thoughts in forms of hegemonic doctrines from the standpoint of periphery and subalterns of international state system by employing the theory Peripheral Realism given by Carlos Escude'.

Key Words: State Centrism, Realism, Power, National Interest, Anarchy, Hierarchy, Hegemony, Peripheral Realism
Introduction
Since the known history of mankind humans are living in a divided world of territorial states. Realists owe the creation of state to human instinct of selfishness, fear, insecurity and mistrust of fellow human beings. To Hobbes the commonwealth was created to protect the humans living in a space from one another as well to defend them from the invasions of others (other states) outside the domain of authoritative state. For the purpose state is equipped with the authority to use force. As a strong state maker the Leviathan overcomes the problematic associated with anarchy within, but the threat is ever and omnipresent outside in an anarchic world system with no world government and law enforcer. To overcome the issue of anarchy existing outside the state opted for the self help mechanism by adopting the strategy of armament and raising national armies. State solved the problem

1 According to Historical Sociologist Michael Mann the only stateless societies have been primitive. There are no complex civilized societies without any center of binding rule making authority, however limited in scope. Hence the rate of survival of societies with states is greater than those without the organized state structure. There is no historical reference that stateless society ended passed a primitive level of development, and numerous examples of state societies absorbing or eliminating stateless ones. (Mann 2006, 120-121)

2 Term Leviathan is used for sovereign by Hobbes. Sovereign attributed with unlimited powers of state authority including the use of coercion. Keith Kraus and Michael C. Williams critical reading of Hobbes Leviathen reveals that he considers the fear of death as the only true human condition, but the source of this fear varies. In absences of Leviathen the source of this death was the fellows ungoverned by any law and law enforcer, hence in state of nature, the life was nasty brutish and short,.....in such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruits thereof is uncertain”. (Keith Kraus & Michael C Williams 1997)

3 Realist vision of Hobbes depicts that life outside the state is impossible. Michael Mann identifies four main functions of state, i.e. the maintenance of law and order; military defense; maintenance of communication infrastructure and economic redistribution. (Mann 2006, 121) According to R. B. J. Walker, Hobbes “paradigmatic legitimation of the sovereign authority of modern state in his Leviathen is an explicit recognition that state is likely to be the major source of insecurity as well as the only source of order that could make the life possible”. (Walker 1997, 67)
of war of all against all inside but as far as outside is concerned the state of war of all against all remained a problem to be addressed by the states known in Realist literature as “Security Dilemma”. Hence the war and conflict is an inevitable feature in case of conflict of interests between human collective selves, i.e. the states, also to be solved through the use of might. Hobbesian commonwealth with inside/outside dichotomy is the philosophical creation without a historical reference, but it is rooted in history as the historical accounts provide for a system of state in ancient Greek by the name of Hellas, and Hobbes famous treatise on governance was written around the treaty of Westphalia (1648) in 1651 when the European state system had yet to develop its roots.

As the theories are lenses to gaze the reality out there and understand/explain the world. The Leviathan and the account of Peloponnesian War written by Thucydides served as strategic guide to statecraft and state policy in relation to other states. Thucydides not only narrated the happening of War but also constructed a theoretical tool to analyze the causes of wars and defined the principles of State Centric approach to International Relations. The modern state system incepted with the treaty of Westphalia (1648) in Europe, recognizing states as sovereign actors, and considering the power as attribute of state and balance of power as strategy, with the objective to counter any act to build a preponderant position on part of any European state, to threaten the principle of state sovereignty.

The international environment changed with the entry of postcolonial states. All states are supposed to be equals in juridical sense. But can we suppose the postcolonial states equal? With a relative absence of power to employ the self help mechanism to counter security dilemma, and ensure external sovereignty without the aid and help of powerful states. The states in initial phases of state making were heterogeneous entities with a distinct state-society divide, struggling to overcome anarchy inside through infant institutions faced anomalous situations to adopt the state centric Realist approaches as their foreign policy guide. But under the tutelage of rule makers of world order, the postcolonial states adopted the (non)Realist vision as the strategy to survive in anarchic outside arena. The situation compelled Kenneth Waltz to ask
the difficult question, i.e. “why do states exhibit similar foreign policy behavior despite their different political systems and confronting ideologies” (Burchil 2001, 89)

Hence a State centric approach considering the state as the sole and homogenous actor occupied the mainstream scholarship of international Relations as universal to explain state behavior. Drawing on the classic theories of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli, Realist thinkers of present age E.H. Carr, Morgenthau, Ken Waltz and Mearsheimer, views the dynamics of world politics from lenses of power and national interest. Power becomes the means as well as an end to state craft and strategy with the aim to ensure the security and deter the opponent and also enhance influence in terms of “compellence” and status of state in an anarchic world order. (Chris Brown with Kristen Ainley 2005, 83) For Morgenthau, “whatever the ultimate aim of International politics, power is always the immediate aim”. (Robinson 1969, 185) John Mearsheimer fine combing the concept of Morgenthau believes that all states are capable of offense with the ultimate goal of “being the only great power in state system”. Hence for Mearsheimer the great powers are the main actors of world politics. (Mearsheimer 2001)

The Realist scholars represent the states who are considered to be the “Rule Makers”, with a power to command the “Rule takers” obeying the commands of power, as well as the capability to command those who defy and rebel. Hence International Relations as subject is exemplary case study of power/ knowledge correlation with a hegemonic theory tilted towards the purpose of the powerful. From the critical perspective provided by Robert Cox “theory is always for someone and for some purpose”. For Cox “there is no such thing as theory in itself divorced from a standpoint in time and space”. (Burchill 2001, 19)

The prime argument of this paper is that Realist paradigm is the approach of powerful ignoring the dynamics of weak states of system. Although the discipline of international relations produced the contrary argument by name of Liberalism; the Liberal principles in reality camouflaged the real interests and power politics with a cover of ethics and morality. We can trace the elements of power centric approach in liberal thoughts too.
Hence both Realism and its Liberal counterpart are two sides of same coin with a purpose to maintain the status quo. The position of power less is missing in both mega narratives of International Relations. Hence the world politics can be observed from two epistemological standpoints i.e. from the position of power and from the perspective of relative absence of power. Hence a peripheral subaltern standpoint of Realism must be acknowledged to paint the dynamics of real world

The study is divided in four main parts.
The first part will provide a historical overview of working of power politics in Hellas and European State System originating from the treaty of Westphalia (1648).
The second one will give an insight about Realism as dominant paradigm of International Relations and elements of Realism in Liberal beliefs considered to be the dialectical opposite of Realism.
The third segment of study will probe into inadequacies of Realist principles and problem solving aspect of strategic visions of hegemonic policy makers to overcomes the deficiencies inherent in state centrism.
The fourth segment of study will differentiate between the stand points of core and peripheral worlds and a different type of Realism, i.e. the concept of Peripheral Realism given by Carlos Escude'.

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For Cox there are two types of theories i.e. Problem-Solving and critical Theory. Cox claims that problem solving theory takes the world as given and tries to solve the problems within given perspective and legitimate the status quo, whereas, the critical theory reflects on the process of theorizing itself and is directed towards an appraisal of a framework of action. It provides for a strategic action to bring about an alternative world order. (Burchill 2001, 19)
I. State system of Hellas and Europe and working of State Centric Principles

Antecedents of Realist Thought and Practice
Thucydides is considered to be the First Realist thinker of Eurocentric tradition as Europe claims its origin and ancestry from Greek. Thucydides was the witness to inevitable competition and conflict between the state of Hellas as well as the Hellas and the neighboring non-Greek empires, Macedonia and Persia. Greeks established Hellenic League under the leadership of Sparta and Athens to counter the threat of Persia during the Persian Wars (492-477). But inter Greek rivalries resurfaced with a zero sum competition between Corinth and Athens for trade and naval supremacy. The fear of Athenian imperialism and expansion led rivals of Athens to form a counter security alliance under Spartan leadership to deter expansionist designs of Athens. (Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 1988, 38)

Thucydides wrote the account of “The Peloponnesian War”, between Athens and Sparta. The cause of war according to Thucydides was the growth of Athenian power and fear cause by this growing power in Sparta. (Sheehan 2010, 14) Hence the Security Dilemma remains a timeless constant of interstate relations.

The states of Hellas and their neighboring empires were not equals in terms of power. There were few states that can be signified as “great Powers”, i.e. Athens, Sparta, the Persian Empire and many smaller and lesser powers like the island statelets of Aegean Sea. The other theme discussed by Thucydides is hierarchical interstate relations. The pragmatic advice of Thucydides to large as well as small states is to adapt to that natural reality of unequal power. For Thucydides “the strong do what they have the power to do and weak accept what

\[Kautilya Chanakya (Vishnu Gupta) the advisor and minister of Chander Gupta Moriya and Ashok the great is also a Realist thinker and his work “Arthashastra”, written in 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BCE are the notes of advise to potential adherents of power like Machiavelli’s Prince and Hobbes Leviathan. Arthashastra a treatise on politics, statecraft and economics remained on the margins of mainstream studies.\]
they have to accept….this is the safe rule-to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference to one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation”. (Tucydides 1972)

Almost all the strands of Realist thought owe to Thucydides seminal work. He can be attributed as Classical Realist as he sees the continuity of behavior of states based on human nature by claiming , “being what is make it possible to understand clearly the past and future”. Neo-Realists like Kenneth Waltz also draw inspiration from Thucydides as he sees the sources of conflict in interstate politics. (Sheehan 2010, 14-15) Carlos Escude' (Escude' 1997), the pioneer of Peripheral realist school calls Thucydides the first Peripheral Realist cautioning the weak states to act rationally and “behave with deference”, to those superior in power.

**State Centrism in theory and Practice of Westphalian State System**

The Greek System of state was destroyed by the rising power of Alexander the great and eventually Greek states were absorbed by the Roman Empire. Protestant Revolution was responsible for disintegration of Roman Empire that lasted for almost 1700 years (200 BC to 1500 A.D). The system of Empire was a hierarchical and decentralized system, with multiple poles of power both ecclesiastical and secular like Emperor, pope, king/queen and feudal lords. Hence it is signified in historical discourses as “Feudal Europe”. The significance of local Lord was far more in lives of ordinary people subjected to his authority than King/Queen. The protestant reformation challenged the authority of power holders on two levels. i.e. on the supra-state level by challenging the Holy Roman Church/Empire and on sub-state level the authority of feudal.

Protestant reformation advocated by Martin Luther in 1517 were admired by the Kings and Princes who started challenging the Church as well as Empire and finally seceding from Rome by declaring their autonomy and sovereignty in given territories. The modern state system was the result of a continental scale war popularly known as the “Thirty Year War”, starting in 1618 when a largely Catholic Southern
Europe tried to subjugate a Protestant Northern Europe to maintain the status quo. Rise of Protestant Reformation was the immediate cause of war. War started when in Bohemia; the Protestant aristocracy challenged the Spanish authority that was backing the Catholic Church. The war started on the issue of religious toleration, but a multitude of cross cutting interests i.e. dynastic, religious and state involved. (Holsti 1991, 28) It was the first divide between Christendom. “Treaty of Westphalia ensured new frontiers----the distribution of states, the relation between German states and Empire, the zone of influence of France, Sweden and Austria, to maintain a balance between the European States”. A number of states were created, “which could lay claim to their self-assertion and the self-purpose of their policy”. (Foucault 2007, 297)

According to Michel Foucault around the “Thirty Years War, we find a new theoretical strata, in theories of politics. “This new theoretical and analytical strata, this new element of political reason, is force. It is force, the force of State”. (Foucault 2007, 295) Hence legitimate use of force became the prerogative of state, internally as well as externally. The centralized state apparatus extended the authority of kings beyond their courts, and an impersonalized system of “sovereign state” emerged with clear boundaries as the jurisdiction of state. ‘of crucial importance to the process was the emergence of a number of absolutist states together and resulting development of interstate system….sovereignty is constructed on the principle of mutual recognition….the key moment in this mutual recognition process came at the end of Thirty Year War in 1648” (Joe Painter and Alex Jeffery 2009, 23-34)

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) provided the rules of interstate relation. The states ruled by authoritarian monarchs exercising sovereign control over a territory as well as population within their own borders. The states were

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6 Europe with center of Christianity at Europe remained under to universal intuitions the Church and state with no cleavage. Protestant revolution created a North South divide in Europe. After the Second World War, Europe was divided on ideological lines between East and West.
considered to be equal in juridical sense albeit the difference in capability and power. Michel Foucault describes that treaty ended hundred years of religious and political struggles and “led to disappearance of ecclesiastical universalism and its objective to create “Balance of Europe”. The Westphalian state system was run on the principles of state-Centrism (State as the main and unitary actor), self help, and sovereignty. European states resisted the attempts by different state powers to impose their political hegemony and preponderant position on continent; through power and balance of power, by making alliances and counter alliance.

II. Timeless Wisdom of Realism and Elements of Realism in Liberal Thought

Chris Brown is of the view that “there was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war, except for ‘the balance of power’-a notion associated with power politics”, of state centric paradigm. (Chris Brown with Kristen Ainley 2005, 21) The First World War (1914-18) according to Woodrow Wilson and the other liberals was the result of “obsolete” strategy of balance of power and secret diplomatic alliances. The strategy to prevent War caused it. Hence the Liberals proposed new principles of international politics. The proposed approach asked for “open covenants openly arrived at a more comprehensive system of security by the name of “collective security”, ensured by a

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7 As we have already discussed that European states were resisting the effort to attain the hegemonic position in Europe since the Thirty Year War. During the War a coalition of France and Sweden blocked the Austrian empire. The France under Louis XIV (1661-1714) tried to attain continental hegemony but the effort was by English and Dutch alliance. Napoleon's efforts to constitute a European Empire were deterred by a mega alliance of Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria. The diplomatic forum of European states by the name of “concert of Europe” (1815 to 1914) ensured a century of relative peace in Europe. The alliances and mechanism of balance of power were intended to keep peace but it propelled war. When Austria and Germany confronted Serbia with armed force, Russia was duty bound to aid Serbia, and Britain and France were treaty bound to protect and support Russia.
“League of Nations” that had to replace the “Concert of Europe”.
Kenneth Waltz calls Woodrow Wilson the “interventionist liberal”. (Waltz 1959, 110) Liberalism according to Scott Burchill is a problem solving approach. As Wilson was looking towards the strategy of “balance of power as problem, he adopted the Realist strategy of “Buck passing” in the words of offensive Realist John Mearsheimer. Wilson while proposing the doctrine of collective security was not repudiating the principle of force. According to Wilson, “Peace of the world would still rest on force __ the organized major force of mankind-but this would not be the force displayed in balance of power politics of the past. Not a balance of power, but a community of power”. (Waltz 1959, 119)
The justification that Wilson provided to a hostile Senate for his proposed community of power was of an either or kind. “we have only two courses...either we must have a league of nations, by which every nation will help preserve the peace of the world without competitive navy building, or we have incomparably the biggest navy of the world. There is no middle ground”. (Waltz 1959, 110)
The Woodrow Wilson fourteen points emphasizing the need of Promotion of democracy also emphasized on the principle of “Self Determination” with the immediate objective to disintegrate the two European Empires, i.e. the Hapsburg and Ottoman, as well as to counter German Empire Building efforts in Eastern Europe. The principle of self determination proved a double edged sword, extending and exporting the Westphalian state system in Europe and Middle East. It was also the part of strategy of Buck passing to create buffer states in East Europe and counter the USSR and German designs to enhance the respective sphere of influence and gain preponderant position on the continent. The old wine of “balance of power” (a realist strategy) was presented in new bottle of liberalism. Isaiah Bowman, a member of “Scientific Peace”, think tank of

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8 The strategy of “Buck Passing”, is proposed by John Mearsheimer. It is the strategy of power politics where a state tries to get another state or group of states to deter or fight a possible war with an aggressor state. (Mearsheimer 2001)
Woodrow Wilson was concerned with creation of small states in name of self determination. His book “The New World in 1921” provided a view of incoming American internationalism, and expanding geographical and diplomatic strategy of the world. (Joe Painter and Alex Jeffery 2009, 204) Wilson like a true Realist not only buck passed the responsibility to others, i.e. the small states of Eastern Europe to build up militarily to counter aggression and in case of their failure on “security community” to fight on behalf of mankind; he was a classic practitioner of what the Classical Realist Morgenthau proposed in his seminal work, “The Politics among Nations: A Struggle for Power and Peace”. For Morgenthau, “universal moral principles do not guide state behavior….there is no universally agreed set of moral principles. Though, states from time to time will endeavor to cloth their behavior in ethical terms. The use of moral language to justify the external behavior is designed to confer legitimacy and further the national interests of state. (Burchill 2001, 79-80) Wilson in his address to Senate in 1917 asked “is the present war ..a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power”? But as the war proceeded US involvement in War became deep rooted, and a rhetoric of morality started masking real US interest. The great spokesman of US foreign interests signified it as “war of present against the past”, and a “war to bring an end to baleful power of autocracies and to establish justice and freedom for the people of the world”. In 1918 he claimed that “we are fighting for peace….for permanent peace”. (Waltz 1959, 110)

III. Power Politics for Peace and Security (A Realist Utopia): Fallacies of Realist Approach

The Interwar critique of Liberal problem solving is criticized by the Protagonists of power politics as “utopianism”, “idealism”. E. H. Carr built his Realist paradigm vis a vis Liberal Internationalism. The central point of Carr’s approach is that the liberal doctrine overlooked the real conflict inherent in international relations. The conflict between the haves and
have not for the resources that are scarce. For Carr the liberal assumptions that have-nots can be brought under the ambit of morality and law, and forced to behave in a moral manner “under the thumb of haves” and force, is itself against the dictates of ethics. It’s a new kind of power politics by name of liberalism. Carr position according to Chris Brown is “Quasi Marxist”, with “his stress on material scarcity and insistence that law and morality serves the interests of dominant group”. (Chris Brown with Kristen Ainley 2005, 26) 

Carr’s cannot be considered an advocate of naked aggression. He sees the systematic constraints like Norman Angel the utopian liberal who believed that “war never pays. War may achieve a redistribution of resources, but labor not war creates wealth. War has never repaid yet war reoccurs, because the beast in man may glory in carnage”. (Waltz 1959, 224) Hence Norman Angell also attributes the war as a systematic constraint rooted in sinful nature of man.

The war remains a problem for both liberals as well as Realist. The cold war years tell the mega narrative of conflict between two great powers, with the ultimate aim of “becoming the only great power in the system”. According to Historian Neil Smith the resources and markets were the motivating forces for two contender of global hegemony. (Smith 2005) According to Mearsheimer the powers recognized that the “best way to achieve security is to achieve the hegemony, hence eliminating any possibility of challenge on part of another great power”. Though the cause of war may be the control of resources, but without resources no war is possible. Hence the strategy adopted by USA was Buck passing. (Mearsheimer 2001) On the other hand all the old European powers fatigued from the devastations of war found it safe to be in the band wagon. A system of Alliance security was designed incorporating the elements of “security community”, already proposed by the Woodrow Wilson and the ages old strategy of power politics. Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of Eisenhower administration named the new strategy as “Policy for Security and Peace”. According to Dulles “the cornerstone of security for the free nations must be the collective system of defense. No single nation can develop for itself the defensive powers of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so each would
become a garrison state, and none would achieve security….security for the free world depends, therefore upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials”. (Dulles 1977, 68-69)

The concept of shared strength and combining resources was the main pillar of Nixon, “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence”. In his first Foreign Policy Report to Congress in early 1970, Nixon explained his new strategy for “peace”, based on partnership. “A partnership in which United States will participate in defense and development of allies and friends but the America cannot-and will not – all the defense of the free nations of the world”. The ultimate goal of strategy of Realistic deterrence is to ultimately eliminate the use of military force as a means to impose will on other nations. The strategy proposed for military power in hands of nations that wish to preserve peace and freedom. (Liard 1977, 78)

Nixon strategy of Realist Deterrence in many ways is utopian and liberal in content similar to Wilson liberalism. It is a hegemonic doctrine calling for a repudiation of principle of state centric self help, and state’s right to protect their territorial integrity by means of military power. Like the Wilsonian arrangement of collective security it endows certain states with the moral responsibility of preservation of peace. The strategy is also Buck Passing because US do not owe the sole responsibility of deterrence of aggressor. The Strategy has many parallels with Carlos Escude', peripheral realist standpoint outlined in his book Foreign Policy Theory in Manem’s Argentina. (Escude' 1997)

IV. Peripheral Realism: A Strategy for Weak states

Cold War Meta narrative focused on the politics of superpower and hegemonic contenders. However the study of Cold War years reveal that real battles and hot wars of limited scale were fought by the postcolonial states on issues of territory and in name of national (in)cohesion. These States having nascent military capabilities fell to the fallacies of Realist Paradigm and a false perception of national power (pride) with the urge to
impose their wills on the adversary state with force, having almost similar level of relative power. The “Band-Wagoning” with either of the two superpowers gave these states a limited access to develop their military potential. Vanity and national pride contributed in an exaggerated estimation of their real potential to fight. Exaggerated show of power to opponents ended in a security dilemma leading to armament, nuclearization and arms race between the peripheral state actors of world politics in initial stages of economic development. The state centric approach became a real problem because the postcolonial states of periphery was adopting it under the tutelage of the super powers enhancing their dependency on aid and arms of core, hence contributing to their peripheral status. The cost of this classic security dilemma was heavier than dependency and peripheral status and that was the human security. As the burden has to bear by the citizen body the basic needs of citizen body compromised. Hence the approach of “Peripheral Realism” by the Argentinean thinker Carlos Escude’ is based on a security dilemma marginalized by the grand theory of IR. This dilemma is not interstate in nature rather it is intra state between the choice of adopting national pride and state security or economic and human development by adopting a more peace oriented foreign policy. It is a matter of choice between Gun and butter or act of balancing between both. According to Carlos Escude’ “all states faces choices regarding the proportion of their economic, political and diplomatic resources that should be taken away from socioeconomic endeavors (butter), to invest in military power and geopolitical confrontations (guns)”. (Escude’ 2009)

Peripheral Realism as a normative doctrine of international relations by Carlos Escude’ as part of Research program of Instituto Torcuato Di Tella (ITDT) was emerged in context of humiliating and frustrating experience of Argentine war with Great Britain over Falkland.9 It can be attributed as a Critical

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9 The purpose of Research of Instituto Torcuato Di Tilla was constituted to redesign Argentina’s foreign policy. Argentina was adopting a state centric approach of offense and antagonizing North America on diplomatic fronts since 1889 (the time of First Pan American Conference). The country
IR theory as well as an explanatory problem solving one, understanding the role of peripheral countries in interstate system. According to Escude’, the system is not an anarchy but a “Proto-Hierarchy”, with Juridical inequality. He takes all the states “who are neither the permanent members of UN security council nor economic superpowers such as Germany and Japan” as peripheral. He identifies three types of state in terms of power in this “proto-hierarchy” with different roles in system.

a) The powerful enough to contribute to formal and informal rule-making;

b) Those that not being powerful enough to be rule makers, abide by the rules; and

c) Those that although not powerful to be rule makers, rebel against the rules or so called “Pariah” or “Rogue” states.

Hence there are those who commands-who obeys and who rebels. To Escude’, the citizenry has to bear the consequences of foreign policy defined in terms of national interest. What is at stake is the basic human needs of an impoverished population. Hence the theory at once is problem solving and a moral one addressing the real moral issues. To him the ideal foreign policy goal for a peripheral state is economic development. It must be a policy of a trader state having normal to friendly relations with other states, contrary to an ideal state motivated by the vanity and national pride, ready to get compellence through “use of coercion”. To Escude’, it is still Realist in nature because it involves the adaption of proper behaviour by

according to Escude’ has a unique confrontational style of interstate politics. It antagonized the USA in 1945 by championing the “Third Position”, and joining the Non Aligned movement. The War was just to break out with Chile in 1978, had tense relation with Brazil in 1979 with a nuclear Arms race. The real overestimate of power was made when it invaded the Falkland/Malvinas island which had been under the British suzerainty since 1833. Argentina refused to sign the NPT, devoted its scarce resources for enrichment of Uranium and undertook a joint venture with Sadam Hussain for the development of intermediate range guided missile, the Co’ndor II. (Escude’, Peripheral Realism: An Argentine Theory Building Experience 2009)
a real estimate of one’s power and position in hierarchy. (Escude’ 1997, 131-132)

Argentina although having a history of hostility and offense tried to shift its paradigm under Menan (1986-1997) inspired by the doctrine of “Peripheral Realism” and research in ITDT. It was reasoned that Argentina did not really need the Falkland/Malvinas island, indigenous nuclear technology and ballistic missile system. It can be like Canada that doesnot contest French for the possession of St. Pierre and does not aspire to become a nuclear and missile power, and allocates the larger proportion of resources for welfare of its citizen. For Escude’, the Argentina policy of aggression and confrontation in interstate relations were based on an overestimated analysis of its power.10

Argentina that was previously delusioned to be a competitor of grand Global game and it sacrificed the citizen welfare to the quest of regional hegemony. Unnder Menan itrevisited the past mistakes and bandwagoned itself with USA, reapproached with Chile, for amicable resolution of territorial disputes. The country policy became more open and independent as it refused to become a part of US backed Free Trade Areas of America (FTAA). It opted a strategic alliance with Brazil in commercial affairs,counterbalancing its alignment with USA. But real component of strategy of “Peripheral Realism”, was implemented when the country opted in favour of butter instead of guns by reducing not only military budget but also dismantled state owned arms industry capable of producing conventional armoured tanks. (Escude' 2009)

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10 According to Carlos Escude the Argentina’s misperception about its real power was the result of its prosperity during 1880 to 1942 that generated an expectation of becoming a future world power. Carlos believes that the economy of Argentina was tied to that of Great Britain but it was not in any wa dependent to US like other countries of the continent. Like USA it was geographically isolated hence the ideas of inflated power became more deep rooted. The third cause was the educational system of the state that perceived a future constructed on basis of the imagery of country’s past “splendor”. Hence an eclectic ideology of interstate relations was built, that had no relation with the ground realities. (Escude 2016)
Conclusion
The history reveals that state centric approach based on the mechanism of self help rarely implemented. Since the time of Greek and Thucydides, what is practiced is the approach of balance of power based on alliance politics. At times balance of power adopted as strategy to create deterrence and avoid war, it became a cause of war. The strategy of balance of power remained a contested strategy. Jonathen Dymond an early pacifist of 19th century wrote that “whatever can be said in favor of balance of power, can be said only because we are wicked” (Waltz 1959, 20) Neibuhr wrote that “political strategies”, invariably involving “the balancing of power with power are made necessary by the sinful character of man” (Waltz 1959, 28)

The alternative of a security community as alternative to balance of power is proposed not only by the liberals but also the strategy designer of power politics like Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon, unwilling to bear the entire burden of the strategy on country’s resources. Hence, they proposed a sharing of responsibilities as well costs of building potential power for compellence as well as deterrence of aggression. The historical analysis of this paper reveals that community of security is proposed by the hegemonic contenders to create a balance of power. In effect they offered for the strategy of “Bandwagoning” to “Buckpass”, the responsibility on the other powers in their positive influence. The strategy of “bandwagoning”-that is to line up behind a state that is rising in power-is a rational strategy to follow to create balance and provide security as well. (Chris Brown with Kristen Ainley 2005, 101) The strategy of “Bandwagoning” is also adopted by the postcolonial state in nascent stages of their economic and political development, but most often the motif behind this strategy is to enhance the national pride and egoistic motifs to impose will on their opponents. The real victim of this policy was the citizens whose needs were compromised to egoistic national pride. The aid money and military capacity building create a false perception of the power at their disposal in the postcolonial states to achieve the end beyond the reach of their real power. Arms race, nuclearization and egoistic foreign
policy create a real security dilemma for citizen body. The citizen centric approach of “Peripheral Realism” reproached the real issue of the peripheral states and can be signified as a critical approach as well as the solution of problem.
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